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1Introduction
richmond, Virginia, is seldom central to the narrative of the american 
civil rights movement or pointed out in studies of twentieth-century urban 
history. Yet in June 1980 Ebony magazine featured the Commonwealth 
of Virginia’s capital in an article entitled “richmond: Former Confeder-
ate Capital Finally Falls to Blacks.” The column documented the arrival 
of black governance in what was once the industrial capital of slave-based 
tobacco production and the home of the Confederacy. richmond activ-
ist Curtis holt sr. was at the center of the Ebony article. In 1971, holt, 
armed with a tenth-grade education, walked into a federal office in rich-
mond and filed a suit against the city under the authority of the Voting 
rights act (Vra) of 1965. according to holt, richmond’s white leaders 
had in 1969 purposefully diluted the collective power of the city’s black 
voters by annexing portions of Chesterfield County, a primarily white and 
affluent suburb contiguous to richmond. Vote dilution, holt charged, 
cost him a seat on the city council during the election of 1970. Few knew 
it at the time, but holt’s contentions would transform municipal politics 
in richmond. his lawsuit was part of a much larger voting rights revolu-
tion that changed the meaning of representative democracy in america.1
In 1972, holt’s suit led a federal district court to use the Vra’s pre-
clearance clause in section 5 to place a moratorium on richmond City 
Council elections. This moratorium lasted until the U.s. supreme Court 
and the U.s. Department of Justice (DoJ) determined whether the 
annexation of Chesterfield County had indeed diluted—the process of 
diminishing a group’s ability to elect candidates of their choice—blacks’ 
votes by adding nearly 44,000 white suburban residents to the city. The 
suspension of the city council elections lasted for roughly seven years. 
although the Court eventually upheld the annexation, it demanded in 
return that richmonders abandon at-large elections and implement an 
electoral system that allowed african americans, who represented more 
than 50 percent of richmond’s total population prior to the boundary 
expansion, to vote within almost exclusively black districts. racial redis-
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tricting led immediately to the election of a five-to-four black-majority 
council (BmC) in 1977 and the appointment of a nationally celebrated 
civil rights lawyer, henry L. marsh III, to the mayoralty.2
roughly twelve years after Congress passed the Vra, the former cap-
ital of the Confederacy had fallen again. african americans seemed to 
have political control over a city whose foremost tourist attraction, mon-
ument avenue, was and continues to be a street lined with statues honor-
ing Confederate leaders. By the early 1980s, the commonwealth’s capital 
was one of thirteen U.s. cities with populations greater than 100,000 to 
be controlled by a black city council, mayor, and administration. Ebony 
argued that holt, a resident of richmond’s Creighton Court housing 
projects who was generally unkempt and “misplaced infinitives and mis-
pronounced words,” seemed an unlikely candidate to transform a city’s 
political landscape—especially a city that had played such a pivotal role in 
perpetuating oppression of african americans. But holt, the historical 
record demonstrates, had not done it alone.3
richmond, Virginia, founded in 1737 by William Byrd II on the 
James river fall line, was fundamental to the formation of both ameri-
can liberty and american slavery. on one hand, richmond is inextrica-
bly linked to the establishment of american independence. Patrick henry 
delivered the celebrated “Liberty or Death” speech atop Church hill at 
st. John’s Church in 1775. Lawmakers signed Thomas Jefferson’s Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom at richmond’s temporary state capi-
tal building in 1786. some of the loudest cries for american liberty and 
home rule during the revolutionary era came not only from New eng-
land and Pennsylvania but from Virginia as well. ambivalent political and 
economic traditions also characterize richmond’s history. english colo-
nials eventually transformed richmond and the Tidewater region of Vir-
ginia into a tobacco-producing powerhouse during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. as european demand for tobacco increased, local 
tobacco growers and manufacturers came to rely almost exclusively on 
the process of slavery, and slavery made a handful of Virginians extremely 
wealthy. These Virginians, historian edmund morgan contends, “bought 
their independence with slave labor” and tobacco production.4
slavery and segregation shaped richmond’s development well into 
the twentieth century. During the antebellum period, industrial slavery in 
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richmond gave rise to limited freedoms for blacks, and these freedoms 
had a profound influence on future generations of black richmonders. 
Not only was Virginia central to domestic slave trading, but richmond’s 
tobacco factories, flour mills, pig iron production, railways, and canal sys-
tems also represented “the most advanced economic developments in the 
antebellum south.” many of these industries relied almost exclusively on 
slave labor by the mid–nineteenth century. a considerable number of the 
city’s slaves worked in tobacco factories—a multi-million-dollar industry 
by 1860—on or near the James river’s canal system. There were so many 
black tobacco workers, historians now know, that employers were often 
forced to provide “board money” for slaves’ lodging. slaves’ accommo-
dations, which were often near the point of production yet apart from 
slave owners, nurtured personal and communal autonomy. These areas 
eventually gave rise to strong church-based, economic, and family ties 
that survived both the Confederacy’s impressment of slave labor dur-
ing the Civil War and the incremental rise of Jim Crow segregation. In 
1901–1902, white powerbrokers countered blacks’ demands for inde-
pendence by drafting a new state constitution that authorized the use 
of poll taxes and literacy tests. Poll taxes worked—wealthy whites were 
overrepresented in Virginia’s governing bodies until the mid–twentieth 
century. Nearly a century after the Civil War, around 1956, an organiza-
tion of well-heeled black professionals called the richmond Crusade for 
Voters set out to secure black richmonders’ rights as american citizens 
by paying these levies. Curtis holt may have been the centerpiece of the 
Ebony article in 1980, but the Crusade was the engine that drove racial 
politics in richmond.5
No civic organization did more to democratize local politics in twen-
tieth-century richmond than the Crusade. The story told in this book 
describes more than thirty years of national and local politics. It explains 
how local suffragists pressed federal officials to strengthen the Vra and 
redistribute southern political authority along racial lines. The rights 
embodied in the Vra cannot be explained by separating the mobiliza-
tion of black voters on one hand and federal policy directed toward race 
on the other. richmond’s african americans, who watched segregation-
ists use municipal government and New Deal programs to raise whites’ 
standard of living (often at the expense of black communities), skipped 
4  The Dream Is Lost
the protest portion of the freedom struggle and went straight to poli-
tics. They eventually seized political leadership from gradualist african 
american ministers in the late 1950s, registered thousands of black vot-
ers, and challenged white elites’ ascendancy over local politics during the 
early 1960s. The Crusade, led by men and women alike, influenced local 
politics nearly a decade before the Vra and decades before the supreme 
Court mandated the city’s majority–minority district system. These types 
of pre-Vra suffrage crusades—not just civil disobedience and mass pro-
tests—raised political consciousness in black communities across america 
and eventually generated the momentum necessary for Congress to pass 
the Vra. The Vra may have given rise to dramatic changes in ameri-
can political culture, but it also fell short of eliminating, according to 
supreme Court justice ruth Bader Ginsburg, “all vestiges of discrimi-
nation against the exercise of the franchise by minority citizens.” The 
Crusade ushered in a period of profound political promise, but it also wit-
nessed the rise of an era characterized by new political restrictions.6
This book is not merely a triumph narrative about richmond’s con-
tribution to the long struggle for black freedom but also a cautionary 
tale about a city coming to terms with the continuation of racist politi-
cal trends in american life after 1965. The Vra had unintended con-
sequences. as the members of groups such as the Crusade transitioned 
from protest to politics after 1965, their white counterparts embarked on 
a machiavellian crusade of their own: vote dilution and political obstruc-
tionism. White leaders, who had grown accustomed to restricting and 
granting freedoms, remained convinced that african americans lacked 
the intellectual capacity to manage municipal affairs. as black elected offi-
cials assumed control over america’s city halls, they often had to resolve 
social problems left over from the racist policies of the mid–twentieth 
century. The Crusade, its representatives, and black communities across 
the United states had inherited what political scientist h. Paul Friesema 
in 1969 called a “hollow prize.” If annexation led immediately to the 
district system in 1977, the very forces that made richmond’s major-
ity–minority district system possible—an increase in african american 
populations in densely packed enclaves, unremitting residential segrega-
tion, white flight, and an unmistakable pattern of urban retrenchment—
were the same forces that brought about deepening marginalization and 
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dispossession in black communities during the twilight of the twentieth 
century. although african americans maintained a city council major-
ity throughout the 1980s, Ebony could not have written a triumph nar-
rative about black governance in richmond in 1985. White resistance to 
black governance crested at the very moment that black-majority cities in 
america were overcome by deepening demographic and economic crises. 
By 1985, preoccupation with poverty and public safety impinged upon 
the Crusade’s strictly political approach to black equality. african ameri-
cans, who circled the race wagons in the 1960s, no longer agreed on how 
to solve their communities’ problems.7
In telling the story of the civil rights movement in richmond, this book 
connects three subjects: (1) how middle-class african americans used 
politics as a means to empower their communities; (2) how local people 
helped influence national voting rights policy during the civil rights move-
ment; and (3) how race and racism shaped policy and politics in richmond 
well into the twentieth century. This account of richmond’s role in the 
civil rights movement is first and foremost about politics: it explains how 
people used civic organizations, electoral politics, litigation, media, and 
other tactics to influence public policy and reclaim black citizenship from 
the clutches of white supremacy. It also explains the unintended conse-
quences of that reclamation. after decades of studying the ways everyday 
people shaped the quest for civil rights, experts now have a much firmer 
understanding, as historian emilye Crosby contends, of “what and who 
we think” are important to the freedom struggle. In connecting local and 
national matters, this story’s chronology demonstrates that pre–Brown 
v. Board of Education (1954) voter mobilization and national enthusi-
asm for integration gave rise not only to massive resistance but also to a 
specific type of civil rights activism in richmond. recent accounts of the 
american civil rights movement demonstrate that national and interna-
tional events profoundly influenced not merely the movement, but public 
policy. These accounts also confirm that local people worked within the 
context of local circumstances to create the conditions necessary to chal-
lenge Jim Crow. Black richmonders were ruthlessly committed to the 
political aspects of the freedom struggle. african american women, work-
ing poor, public-housing residents, and middle-class technocrats spent 
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the mid- to late twentieth century defining and redefining the meaning 
of american citizenship.8
The richmond Crusade for Voters did not emerge from thin air: its 
members inherited a drawn-out struggle against Virginia’s culture of rac-
ist civility. Three specific factors gave rise to the Crusade: richmond’s 
legacy of gradualist leadership, growing momentum for voting rights 
mandates before 1965, and Virginia’s history of racist paternalism. John 
Brooks, Lola hamilton, Dr. William Ferguson reid, ethel T. overby, and 
Dr. William s. Thornton created the Crusade in 1956 to combat mas-
sive resistance to public-school integration. The Crusade had immediate 
roots in african american gradualism and the National association for 
the advancement of Colored People (NaaCP). Before the mid-1950s, 
limited interracial cooperation characterized richmond’s color line—the 
story of how black leaders collaborated with a handful of moderate white 
elites to hammer out solutions to various grievances is now well known. 
although whites often dictated the terms of racial improvements, they 
relied on a “better class of black leaders to counsel prudence and ensure 
that change” occurred within the context of white paternalism. Yet even 
within this context of racist civility, african american leaders continued to 
challenge the boundaries of racial segregation in richmond. richmond 
not only elected oliver W. hill to the city council in 1948 but also—
roughly one hundred miles south of the nation’s capital—became a “bee-
hive” for the NaaCP’s desegregation lawsuits during the early 1950s. as 
whites manufactured massive resistance to public-school integration, the 
Crusade revolted against poll taxes and black ministers who supported 
only moderate racial reforms. The Crusade believed that the racial polar-
ization brought on by the Brown decision called for more robust political 
organization. It not only had the financial resources to create a self-sus-
taining network of precinct-based groups but also mobilized to pay oth-
ers’ poll taxes, registered thousands of black voters, and raised political 
consciousness with the help of the area’s black newspaper, the Richmond 
Afro-American & Planet. By 1964, the Crusade facilitated the election of 
an african american, B. a. “sonny” Cephas, to the city council and was 
instrumental in shaping local policy.9
The maelstrom that followed the Brown decision and the rise of direct-
action demonstrations often overshadows the story of african americans’ 
Introduction  7  
“re-enfranchisement.” The Crusade was part of—and essential to—the 
larger voting rights movement taking place below the mason–Dixon line 
before 1965. The idea that african americans were not voting at all in the 
south prior to 1965 is a popular misconception about the freedom strug-
gle. This notion also belies the data. In 1956, one million of the south’s 
roughly five million african americans had registered to vote. In their 
search for the civil rights movement’s origins, scholars have demonstrated 
that black americans in cities such as atlanta, Louisville, Wilmington, 
and as far south as sunflower County, mississippi, not only drew from 
organizing traditions that often predated the 1930s but also parlayed the 
urgency from World War II and Brown into voter mobilization move-
ments. It is difficult to understand how local people and organizations 
such as the Crusade changed national voting rights policy without exam-
ining the voter mobilization campaigns that predated 1965. after Con-
gress passed the Civil rights act of 1957, which was largely about voting 
rights, both the southern Christian Leadership Conference (sCLC) and 
the NaaCP committed themselves to voter registration.10
The Crusade’s voter mobilization campaigns force us to reimagine 
the Brown-to-selma narrative of the civil rights movement. Not only 
did national civil rights organizations such as the sCLC and NaaCP 
capitalize on indigenous political movements, but the struggle between 
black mobilization and vested white political interests also provided the 
basis for what became the Vra. The NaaCP’s executive secretary, roy 
Wilkins, made Crusade member John Brooks the national organiza-
tion’s voter registration director in 1958. Brooks and a handful of south-
ern organizers single-handedly orchestrated the NaaCP’s “miracle of 
1960”—a campaign to register three million african americans before 
1960 that has received scant attention from historians. martin Luther 
King Jr., the sCLC, and the events that culminated in selma, alabama, 
during the summer of 1965 certainly motivated President Lyndon B. 
Johnson to sign a voting rights bill. Yet attorney General Nicholas Kat-
zenbach and federal policy makers in fact wrote the provisions of the 
Vra to preclude the types of disenfranchisement that Brooks, organi-
zations such as the Crusade, and national civil rights organizations had 
encountered during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In telling the story 
of black richmonders’ pursuit of the ballot, this book demonstrates that 
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local people inspired national civil rights organizations to lobby for vot-
ing rights.11
The Crusade’s struggle for political power would not have been pos-
sible without the organizational and political will of richmond’s black 
women. The historical record on women’s involvement in the Crusade’s 
founding is not commensurate with the historical reality: women and 
gender were fundamental to the organization’s formation and preser-
vation. “history of the Crusade: report of the historian”—in particu-
lar the section on the Crusade’s founding—is guilty of the same “sin of 
omission” that too often characterizes what the late Julian Bond called 
“the master narrative” of the civil rights movement. recent community 
studies of the freedom struggle have dismantled this master narrative by 
demonstrating the myriad contributions women made to the movement 
as both secondary figures and leaders. Women, we know now, were more 
than matrons of the movement. In their recent examinations of race in 
richmond, scholars such as Lewis randolph, Gayle Tate, and Caroline 
emmons demonstrate that women played a critical yet unsung role dur-
ing the fight for voting and civil rights. The Crusade’s first meetings took 
place in ethel T. overby’s home, and by the late 1950s overby and the 
Crusade transformed people’s homes into a type of cottage industry for 
voter mobilization activity. This story of racial politics in richmond is 
not just about men’s and women’s roles but also about how expecta-
tions of manhood and womanhood shaped the struggle for civil rights in 
richmond.12
Black women held positions of actual influence within the Crusade, 
helped transition from protest to politics, and led the way into elected 
office. The ethel overbys of the movement—overby was the first black 
public-school principal in richmond, led the fight against whites’ mas-
sive resistance to integration and equal political rights, cofounded the 
Crusade, and was its finance chair—existed on a long continuum of 
black women in richmond specifically and Virginia generally (i.e., mag-
gie Walker and Barbara Johns) who initiated the fight against segregated 
transportation and education well before the late 1950s. much has been 
made of the ways patriarchy, masculine histrionics, and the politics of 
moral suasion informed civil rights leadership. We know now that the 
movement’s men often relegated women to secondary work. middle-
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class civil rights organizations, historian Barbara ransby argues, “empha-
sized the primacy of women’s domestic roles.” National stories of black 
voter mobilization often emphasized male leadership because men were 
often the movement’s most visible representatives. men were often polit-
ical spokespersons and the first elected officials. But community stud-
ies of the civil rights movement shed light on a different story. Women 
struggled with patriarchy and secondary roles. While a great number of 
middle-class women in the Crusade were what the anthropologist Karen 
sacks calls “center-women”—women of status who took on the roles of 
informal leadership—a handful floated between the all too familiar binary 
spaces of leadership and followership. These women—for instance, rich-
mond’s first black councilwoman, Willie J. Dell—were the Crusade’s 
“bridge leaders.” as african americans moved into electoral politics, 
women—who often worked directly with vulnerable communities as 
social workers and activists—bridged the divide between vulnerable com-
munities, grassroots organizing, and official political power. as poverty 
deepened throughout richmond’s black communities, these women also 
led the charge against middle-class political leadership.13
The ways white southerners controlled race relations also influenced 
the types of civil rights movements that emerged in richmond and postwar 
america. on one hand, Virginia’s poll tax, not threats of mob violence, 
dictated who voted in the commonwealth. richmond’s african ameri-
cans used voter mobilization to challenge Jim Crow because Virginia’s 
white powerbrokers, under the auspices of senator harry F. Byrd and his 
reputed “machine,” allowed some blacks to vote well before 1965. Byrd’s 
Democratic machine also maintained segregation through paternalistic 
elitism rather than through violent rigidity. It is difficult to understand 
how Virginia’s african americans organized civil rights strategies without 
recognizing how the commonwealth’s white elites, who embraced seg-
regation but rejected maintaining the color line by force, sustained their 
age-old skepticism of broad-based democracy by practicing a regionally 
specific brand of racist civility and genteel paternalism. Before Brown, 
richmond’s white elites maintained segregation by handing out piece-
meal concessions to gradualist black leaders. Byrd engineered racial soli-
darity around the issue of massive resistance to public-school integration, 
and the racial polarization brought on by massive resistance undermined 
10  The Dream Is Lost
both the commonwealth’s “friendly” race relations and a significant num-
ber of gradualist black ministers (which is largely why professionals rather 
than ministers led the freedom struggle in richmond). When it came to 
black voting, Byrd Democrats knew they could pay lip service to lim-
ited black political participation without conceding substantive political 
power. Yet even Byrd understood that if more blacks paid poll taxes, they 
might swing the balance of power in local elections because the levies also 
suppressed large white voter turnout. The Crusade eventually confirmed 
Byrd’s fears.14
massive resistance to public-school integration may have brought 
an end to the practice of maintaining segregation by promoting friendly 
race relations, but it did little, this book demonstrates, to extricate white 
elites from positions of entrenched power. richmond’s white establish-
ment maintained its paternalistic proclivities well into the 1980s. The Vra 
and the abolition of state and local poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections (1966) not only reenergized the Crusade but also crystallized 
white resistance.15 Crusade members and their allies on the city council 
spent the late 1960s fighting against police brutality, urban-renewal proj-
ects, and the construction of two expressways. In time, white officials came 
to associate the Crusade’s demands with the Black Power movement. after 
1965, white leaders advocated for interracial cooperation while secretly 
devising color-blind structural barriers (i.e., annexations) that prohibited 
blacks from assuming real political power. These barriers affirmed some 
Virginians’ belief that good government was still synonymous with elite 
whiteness. Federal policy makers and the supreme Court disagreed.
This book also examines the complex coalitions and litigation that emerged 
during the late 1960s as african americans fought to preserve the Vra. 
american cities labored to negotiate the friction between their history 
of oppressing blacks and their openness to progressive political reforms. 
after 1965, richmond was part of a much larger revolution in voting 
rights. Curtis holt’s claim that annexation diluted blacks’ votes ran rich-
mond right into a national voting rights revolution. This so-called reap-
portionment revolution, which local litigants started, earl Warren’s Court 
accommodated, and Warren Burger’s Court strengthened, went beyond 
safeguarding access to the suffrage. as whites devised structural barriers 
Introduction  11  
to dilute the voting power of recently enfranchised african americans, 
federal officials began to protect a minority group’s right to elect pre-
ferred representatives in a manner that was commensurate with their total 
voting-age population. The supreme Court, using an employment-based 
affirmative-action remedy known as “disparate-impact analysis,” eventu-
ally recognized that the discriminatory effect of electoral laws mattered 
just as much as the discriminatory intent. although the Court struggled 
to find a solution to vote dilution, it found that a “presence of factors,” 
known as the “totality of circumstances” test, made it difficult for minority 
voters to elect more than a handful of public officials. White officials com-
bined white and black districts, relocated polling places to white neighbor-
hoods, threatened economic reprisals against black voters and candidates, 
switched to at-large election systems, and, in the Deep south, contin-
ued to intimidate voters with violence. National policy makers and the 
supreme Court, which acknowledged that resistance to the Vra might 
be characterized as undemocratic, came to prefer majority–minority dis-
tricts as a solution to vote dilution. racial redistricting not only protected 
a minority group’s right to elect candidates but also allowed minority vot-
ers to elect preferred candidates free of white interference.16
The political abuses of electoral reforms have been a continuous and 
unfortunate feature of U.s. political history, and politics following the 
Vra was no exception to this rule. The United states, experts contend, 
often sways back and forth between greater political access and more 
political restrictions. We know a great deal about the personal motives of 
high-ranking political figures who were integral to passing and strength-
ening the civil rights bills. recent assaults on key provisions in the Vra 
and the reemergence of direct disenfranchisement have forced scholars to 
move beyond portraying voting rights mandates as a triumph narrative. 
If officials implemented majority–minority districts during the 1970s to 
counteract machinations such as richmond’s annexation of Chesterfield 
County, they also designed these districts to “redress present, institution-
alized manifestations of historical injustices against blacks as a group.” 
The story of how Washington preserved the spirit of the civil rights bills 
is outlined in the pages to come, but it has also been well documented by 
scholars and historians of voting rights.17
Institutional political stability between Congress, the supreme 
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Court, and the federal executive branch became critical to the preserva-
tion of the second reconstruction. In many ways, white resistance to the 
Vra and the documentation of that opposition by the U.s. Commission 
on Civil rights had an unintended consequence. as african americans 
transformed the civil rights movement from “protest to politics,” from 
right to reality, whites continued to design rules, such as annexations, 
that appeared on their face to deny no one the right to vote. majority–
minority districts—the crowning achievement of the so-called reappor-
tionment revolution—gave rise to an unprecedented, albeit brief, period 
of explicitly defined racial politics in the United states. This racial democ-
racy, by diversifying southern and american politics, seemed at that time 
to represent a durable shift in american governing authority.18
Washington’s commitment to preserving the civil rights bills also 
had unintended consequences for the future of african american asso-
ciationalism. The federal government’s protection of Great society leg-
islation during the late 1960s and 1970s convinced men such as Curtis 
holt, for better or worse, to hedge their bets against institutional bigotry 
with the liberal state. Black southerners knew that state and local govern-
ing bodies were, as historian Thomas sugrue argues, “the key architects 
of racial inequality” and executors of Jim Crowism. In many ways, “the 
smaller the government, the more black support for it eroded.” as Presi-
dent Johnson championed an “equality of results” standard—the belief 
that civil rights laws needed to engender a proportional share of results 
such as employment, office holding, resources, and so on—african amer-
icans came to believe that the federal government was “a positive agent 
for social change.” after 1965, many civil rights advocates defended the 
value of their hard-won right to vote not by protesting or demonstrat-
ing but by working quietly within the democratic system. as we shall see, 
sustained resistance to the Vra led the freedom struggle to revert to 
the legal and political strategies that helped define the movement before 
the montgomery bus boycott. During the late 1960s and 1970s, a del-
uge of litigation (fifty cases or more) concerning vote dilution inundated 
state and federal court systems. Civil rights laws, according to leading 
scholars of Black Power, moderated the movement by convincing african 
americans to lodge their grievances against racism in Washington. This 
transition away from extrainstitutional forms of community mobilization 
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toward a greater reliance on federal protections was evident not just in 
the War on Poverty, as experts have demonstrated, but also in the case of 
voting rights. For people such as Curtis holt, the reapportionment revo-
lution was evidence that federal officials had finally embraced the central-
ity of race in american politics.19
as black governance supplanted registration drives, contention over 
racial politics and redistricting was often most pronounced at the local 
level. racial politics after 1965 was not a southern matter exclusively. as 
scholars expand the field of twentieth-century urban history, we know 
now that few cities with sizeable black populations were immune to rising 
anxiety over Black Power. The fear of a black takeover rose in cities that 
witnessed actual racial unrest in the late 1960s, and whites often accused 
blacks of extremism even in cities where african americans had few con-
nections to the Black Power movement. Black richmonders, who elected 
three african americans to city council in 1966, took an almost strictly 
political approach to the freedom struggle. By 1968, working-class and 
working-poor african americans as well as the new generation of young 
activists (drawing from richmond’s sit-in movement of the early 1960s) 
were exhausted by the pace of racial reforms. The annexation of Chester-
field County confirmed their weariness. Not only was annexation a panic 
reaction to the possibility that blacks might assume control over city hall 
in 1970, but many white elites also came to believe that black governance 
was synonymous with government for blacks only. racial redistricting 
and the BmC exacerbated these anxieties. White opposition to voter pro-
tections grew even more intense as districts guaranteed black represen-
tation at city hall, and black representatives struggled to negotiate the 
tension between rising expectations in their communities and managing 
municipal affairs. richmonders soon found out something that policy 
makers and voting rights experts have known for some time—Washing-
ton often fixes one problem at the expense of creating another.20
Ultimately, this book describes how public policy shaped richmond’s 
development. If the first part of this story (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on 
municipal politics in richmond prior to annexation within the context of 
the black freedom struggle, the second part (chapters 3, 4, and 5) follows 
the unintended consequences of majority–minority districts and ques-
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tions more broadly what became of the civil rights movement. The latter 
chapters also trace how Jim Crow–era policies shaped life in richmond 
well into the 1980s. The facts that mid-twentieth-century disinvestment 
characterized many of richmond’s black neighborhoods and that many 
of these areas still nurtured poverty even at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury should surprise few experts. That so little has been written about 
this portion of richmond’s history—particularly given the city’s key role 
in domestic slave trading, industrial slavery, the Confederate cause, and 
massive resistance—is disquieting.21
By the 1970s and 1980s, years of well-orchestrated disinvestment and 
social engineering had taken its toll on a significant number of predomi-
nantly african american cities. richmond, like most american cities, in 
fact used federal and state tax money—from New Deal programs to the 
block grants of the 1970s—to underwrite resegregation after the 1930s. 
Prior to World War II, not only did private lenders use money from the 
Federal housing administration to reinforce existing patterns of residen-
tial segregation, but white elites also invested this money in their own 
communities at the expense of black neighborhoods. By the 1950s, rich-
mond’s african american neighborhoods struggled to keep pace with 
their white counterparts. These neighborhoods were severely blighted, 
lacked sewage drains and indoor plumbing, and suffered from poor edu-
cational facilities. as richmond tapped the wellspring of federal largess to 
clear its slums during the social engineering campaigns of the 1950s and 
1960s, city officials compressed a large number of african americans into 
a handful of public-housing divisions. These divisions incubated poverty, 
were in earshot of one another, and were in close proximity to down-
town. as manufacturing jobs relocated to richmond’s outlying counties 
and the city transitioned toward semiprofessional, professional, and ser-
vice employment, growing disparities in education and economic access 
were most apparent throughout black richmond.22 much of the eco-
nomic vulnerability that emerged during the 1980s was by design.
There was nothing exceptionally southern about mid-twentieth-cen-
tury infrastructure building in richmond. By the 1970s and 1980s, years 
of systemic neglect had given rise to glaring economic vulnerability, and 
this vulnerability characterized most american cities with sizeable black 
populations. Local policy makers relied on many of the same urban poli-
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cies and planners that other cities employed. In fact, richmond took the 
robert moses approach to urban redevelopment in the attempt to address 
automobile congestion, slum clearance, and public housing. richmond’s 
master plan eventually displaced tens of thousands of african americans 
and compacted them—thanks to restrictive covenants—into smaller and 
smaller enclaves. holt may have personified african americans’ triumph 
over the forces of disenfranchisement, but the public-housing resident 
was also emblematic of an intensifying economic crisis. In 1970, one year 
prior to holt’s suit, the poverty rate for richmond’s african american 
families stood at nearly 25 percent (roughly 15 percent higher than the 
national average), and only 16 percent of african americans over twenty-
five years old completed high school. Black neighborhoods in the capi-
tal city were more segregated by class and race in 1980 than they were 
in 1960. although the grind of twentieth-century urban history was not 
inevitable, if you were poor and black in richmond, it may have appeared 
so by the mid-1980s.23
racial redistricting may have ensured that minorities could elect black 
candidates, but districts also intensified racial animosity at city hall. shortly 
after 1977, black politicians in richmond, led by mayor henry marsh, 
sought to redirect service deliverables to communities that segregationists 
had purposefully neglected. They also tried to secure their positions on the 
city council by redrawing safer district boundaries and firing white admin-
istrators. as african american council members rejected their position as 
political cue takers, however, whites argued that mayors such as marsh, 
marion Barry, and maynard Jackson were race leaders rather than city 
managers. richmond’s BmC found out about diplomacy the hard way—if 
black politicians were to implement substantive policy changes and bring 
material resources to struggling communities, they first had to fight their 
way through white skepticism. They also needed to work with colleagues 
from white-majority districts. These colleagues were the very white leaders 
who detested racial redistricting and were often unconvinced that blacks 
could do the job. african americans may have taken control of city halls, 
but they often lacked the types of private–public relationships that, accord-
ing to leading urban-regime theorists, cities need to thrive.24
By the 1980s, the era of possibility was in deep jeopardy. Districts 
were the price that african americans initially paid to counter white 
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backlash against the voting rights revolution. When it came to accessing 
the full panoply of resources needed to govern metropolitan richmond, 
this price undeniably proved to be high. By following black mobiliza-
tion to its logical conclusion, electoral empowerment and governance, 
we see not only that white resistance to black governance continued to 
be a defining feature of black-led city halls but that the reagan rollbacks 
exacerbated forces such as white flight and concentrated poverty. his-
torian robert o. self argues that the struggle over postwar economic 
growth and metropolitan expansion in predominantly black cities rep-
resented “more than a transition from an era of possibility to an era of 
limits.” These struggles personified what was at stake for america’s cities 
after World War II.25
Between 1978 and 1982, members of richmond’s city council white 
minority not only threatened to bring downtown revitalization to a 
standstill but also carried on the politics of paternalism and obstruction-
ism by refusing to share power with members of the BmC. as the reagan 
administration scaled back aid to cities in the early 1980s and middle-class 
residents relocated to outlying counties, a cascade of results-oriented eco-
nomic pragmatism washed away black officials’ civil rights–based opti-
mism, and these elected officials had to come to terms with a stark political 
reality. City hall needed to deal with powerful business interests to address 
the sharp limitations on its own authority. even more ominously, Virgin-
ia’s rules governing city–county independence (i.e., Dillon’s rule) meant 
that richmond had no official authority to work with its surrounding 
counties without an explicit mandate from Virginia’s still largely white 
and increasingly republican General assembly. richmond’s BmC was no 
exception to the rule when it came to meeting the challenges of urban 
revitalization. Black mayors and their regimes attempted to lure investors 
back into their cities by emphasizing high-profile politics—they argued 
that shopping malls, convention centers, and hotels would resurrect the 
dying city center. richmond’s black politicians spent the better portion of 
the 1980s manufacturing their own silver-bullet strategies. Both henry 
marsh (in the form of richmond renaissance) and richmond’s second 
black mayor, Dr. roy West (in the form of affirmative-action contracts), 
believed that revitalizing downtown would reinvigorate richmond’s tax 
base, create jobs, and alleviate poverty.26
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as the BmC struggled to build its way to a better richmond, the 
problem of class became more apparent within the black body politic. 
although richmond’s intra-racial class struggle is not emblematic of 
the entire story of black governance, it contains essential qualities that 
enhance our understanding of race and american political development 
on the local level. If voting became a means to an end—a way to gain 
community control—by the early 1980s african americans were no lon-
ger in agreement about how to solve their communities’ problems. The 
story of late-twentieth-century urban history is replete with examples of 
technocratic black mayors who supplanted civil rights–era mayors. There 
was nothing particularly unique about the ways richmond’s black poli-
ticians met the challenges of urban retrenchment, declining tax bases, 
white flight, high crime, deepening poverty, and fledgling schools dur-
ing the 1980s. Because cities are more limited in their ability to tax than 
state and federal governing bodies, public–private coalitions take special 
precedent in municipal politics. mayors such as West, Tom Bradley, and 
Wilson Goode built private and public interracial coalitions by promoting 
efficient government and moderating appeals to racial favoritism. once 
these middle-class black leaders, J. Phillip Thompson argues, “accepted 
the practical limitations on advocacy and policy change required by their 
new, often fragile, coalitions with business and white liberal reformers,” 
they struggled to address the needs of vulnerable communities. roy West 
may have become the cause célèbre for richmond’s growing black mid-
dle class when he secured 30 percent set-asides for minority contractors, 
but these contracts were evidence of a more ominous rift. West, who con-
spired with white council members to appoint himself mayor in 1982 and 
had no history of civil rights activism in richmond, met the challenges 
of municipal politics in the 1980s by working exclusively from a white 
power base. The forces of intensifying black poverty and a growing black 
middle class, the sociologist eric Brown argues, “meant that the experi-
ence of racism was not as common as it had been before” and during the 
civil rights era.27
Black women led the charge against pragmatic governance. During 
the 1970s, Curtis holt and a Yale-educated lawyer named Jeroyd Greene 
had warned public officials that heightened residential segregation and 
deepening poverty were destroying richmond. Women, who were con-
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tinuous fixtures in richmond politics, not only became the most vocal 
spokespersons against the black political establishment but also led the 
way in what Laurie Greene calls the “politics of protection.” richmond’s 
murder rate per capita was second only to that of Detroit, michigan, in 
1985. Black women such as Willie Dell, who became the first female afri-
can american councilperson in richmond in 1973, began to couch the 
struggle against economic vulnerability and residential isolation as civil 
rights violations. Dell and social activist alma marie Barlow spent the 
early 1980s intentionally politicizing the fight against crime and poverty 
and openly promoted the need for more pointed social welfare programs. 
as the black middle class raised its standard of living by securing affirma-
tive-action-based set-asides, these women advocated for targeted policies 
that might move poor people into living-wage status. Women and their 
allies not only accused the Crusade of clandestinely supporting West but 
also contended that the middle-class leadership cared little about justice 
for all african americans. redistricting eventually did Dell in—roy West 
defeated her in 1982 and 1984. and Dell’s appeals to black unity drew 
fire from her district’s middle-class residents, who were preoccupied with 
securing public deliverables. In mandating majority–minority districts, 
federal policy makers were victims of an ecological fallacy—they assumed 
that african american officials would inevitably represent their commu-
nity’s political interests most effectively.28
Disillusioned by a lack of economic progress and what appeared to be 
the return of control by white elites (despite the fact that blacks still held 
a five-to-four council majority), many black richmonders came to believe 
that politics had failed to bring about the types of broad-based equality 
that african americans had envisioned during the civil rights movement.
